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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Evin Christopher Devan appeals his conviction from a jury verdict finding 
him guilty of felony counts of conspiracy and burglary, and a misdemeanor count 
of trespassing. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A jury found Evin Christopher Devan guilty of felony conspiracy, felony 
burglary, and misdemeanor trespassing. (R., Vol. I, pp. 19-21, 82-83; Vol. II, pp. 
151, 232.) The district court sentenced Devan to a unified term of five years with 
two years fixed on each felony count, but suspended execution of judgment and 
ordered probation. (R., Vol. I, pp. 120-21.) Devan timely appealed. (R., Vol. II, 
pp. 127-28.) 
During closing argument, the prosecutor commented that "the argument[s] 
of the lawyers" were "gobbledygook" to the extent they conflicted with the court's 
instructions. (Trial Tr., p. 614, L. 19 - p. 615, L. 6.) The prosecutor also stated 
that the defense argument that an expert was needed to compare footprints in 
the case was "insulting" because the comparison could be made using "common 
sense." (Trial Tr., p. 616, L. 10 - p. 617, L. 1.) Devan's sole issue on this 
appeal challenges the prosecutor's comments as fundamental error. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 10.) 
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ISSUES 
Devan states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of fundamental 
error, when the prosecutor used inflammatory language calculated to 
appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury, disparaged defense 
counsel, and misstated the arguments raised by defense counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 10.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Devan failed to show error, much less fundamental error, because Idaho 
case law supports that the prosecutor's comments at issue here were not 
misconduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
Devan Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, Because 
Idaho Case Law Supports That The Prosecutor's Comments At Issue Here Were 
Not Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Devan argues the prosecutor committed misconduct that infringed on his 
right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) Although the alleged misconduct 
was not objected to at trial, Devan asserts it rose to the level of fundamental 
error thus warranting reversal. (Id.) Applying Idaho case law to the record, 
Devan fails to satisfy his burden on appeal. 
B. Legal Standard 
In general, Idaho's appellate courts will not consider allegations of error to 
which counsel has failed to timely object at trial. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 
181, 24 P.3d 77, 82 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 
634, 977, P.2d 890, 896 (1999). The exception is in criminal cases where the 
defendant shows fundamental error. Norton, 151 Idaho at 181, 24 P.3d at 82. 
For this, a defendant must show error that (1) violates an unwaived constitutional 
right, (2) is clear or obvious from the appellate record, (3) and that affected the 
outcome of defendant's trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 
978 (2010)). As an initial matter, if the appellate court finds no error, it need not 
address the three-prong test. Norton, 151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at 90. As 
discussed below, there was no error here. 
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C. Under Idaho Case Law, The Prosecutor's Comments Were Not 
Misconduct, Thus There Was No Error 
Parties at trial are given considerable latitude in making closing arguments 
to the jury. State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, 271, 270 P.3d 1054, 1056 (Ct. 
App. 2011 ). Although prosecutors are "expected and required to be fair," the 
courts recognize the reality that "[a] fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial." 
Norton, 151 Idaho at 188, 254 P.3d at 89 (citation omitted). In Norton, the Court 
of Appeals held that the prosecutor's references to defense arguments as "red 
herrings and smoke and mirrors" were not misconduct. Norton, 151 Idaho at 
189, 254 P.3d at 90. In so holding, the court specifically noted that the 
comments were not directed at defense counsel personally, but at counsel's 
theories. Id. 
In arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct, Devan misquotes 
and thus mischaracterizes the prosecutor's closing argument. (See Appellant's 
brief, p. 13.) An accurate quote, in its proper context shows the prosecutor's 
intent to clarify the correct legal standard for the jury to apply: 
Gobbledygook, that's what the argument of the lawyers are, and 
that's what the judge has instructed you to do (indicating). So the 
first thing I'm going to ask you to do is throw out all of the argument 
that the defense attorney gave you about clear and convincing 
evidence, yadda, yadda, yadda. That's not the standard. You 
won't find it anywhere in your jury instructions. You have an 
instruction on what reasonable doubt is. If you have any doubt 
about it, read it. It doesn't say anything about clear and convincing 
evidence. To compare the two is an error. 
(Trial Tr., p. 614, L. 19 - p. 615, L. 6.) The prosecutor argued the jury should 
disregard the defense argument about "clear and convincing evidence" because 
· it is not the correct standard, and is thus contrary to the judge's instructions. 
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(See also Trial Tr., p. 615, Ls. 7-16.) Because the comment was directed at 
defense argument, it is not misconduct. Norton, 151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at 
90. 
Devan also argues the prosecutor's use of the word "insulting" was 
inflammatory, and therefore misconduct. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) In the 
comment in question, the prosecutor challenged the defense argument that 
expert testimony was needed to compare footprints, calling it "insulting." (See 
Trial Tr., p. 609, L. 12 - p. 610, L. 25; p. 616, Ls. 10-15.) In other words, the 
prosecutor told jurors he trusted them to evaluate the evidence without needing 
an expert to do the evaluating for them. (Trial Tr., p. 616, Ls. 16-22.) The 
context of the prosecutor's comments shows they were made in response to the 
defense's arguments and were not calculated to inflame the emotions and 
passions of jurors. See State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 909, 231 P.3d 549, 
554 (Ct. App. 2010). Thus Devan's argument fails. 
Devan cites several cases in which the courts found prosecutorial 
misconduct. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.) Those cases are distinguishable 
because the alleged misconduct was not, as here, prosecutorial comments 
directed at defense arguments. Troutman, 148 Idaho at 909-10, 231 P.3d at 
554-55 (prosecutor's comments improperly urged jury to return verdict based on 
emotions and passions rather than evidence); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20, 
189 P.3d 477, 482 (Ct. App. 2008) (prosecutor's statements improperly vouched 
for state and state's witness); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 
588 (Ct. App. 2008) (prosecutor comments that jury might be irritated by 
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testimony of defendant's girlfriend and brother were improper); State v. Beebe, 
145 Idaho 570, 575-76, 181 P.3d 496, 501-02 (Ct. App. 2007) (prosecutor 
improperly misrepresented or mischaracterized evidence, appealed to jury to 
consider factors other than evidence of guilt); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 
657, 691 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ct. App. 1985) (inflammatory statements by 
prosecutor implying "facts" not in evidence were improper). 
Because Devan cannot establish misconduct, there simply is no error, and 
the court need not address the three-prong fundamental error inquiry. Norton, 
151 Idaho at 189, 254 P.3d at 90. Indeed, absent error, all three prongs of the 
Perry test - violation of unwaived rights, clear error, and prejudice - are not 
satisfied. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Even if the comments 
were error satisfying the first two prongs of the fundamental error standard, 
Devan cannot show the remaining prong, that the alleged errors affected the 
outcome of his trial. 
D. The Alleged Errors Were Harmless 
For the third prong of the Perry fundamental error test, defendant bears 
the burden of proving a reasonable probability that the asserted error affected 
the outcome of his case. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. The 
overwhelming evidence supports that the jury reached its verdict regardless of 
the alleged prosecutorial misconduct - the prosecutor's comments in closing. 
Co-defendant Darrin Boren testified that Devan participated, with six others, in a 
plan to commit burglary. (Trial Tr., p. 348, L. 13 - p. 351, L. 8; p. 353, L. 2 - p. 
356, L. 4; p. 359, L. 17-p. 361, L. 23; p. 362, Ls. 2-23; p. 363, Ls. 1-19; p. 364, 
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Ls. 2-5; p. 366, Ls. 9-16.) Co-defendant Tiffany Jones also testified that Devan 
was part of the group that went to burglarize the property, and that she and 
Devan were in the car that drove away from the scene of the crime. (Trial Tr., p. 
427, L. 24 - p. 428, L. 22; p. 429, Ls. 7-21; p. 430, Ls. 1-17.) Jones testified that 
during the planning, Devan said, referring to the burglary, "let's go and get this 
done." (Trial Tr., p. 431, Ls. 10-20.) 
Testimony by Police Officer Dale Schreiber further confirmed Devan's 
involvement. Officer Schreiber testified that, as part of the burglary investigation, 
he was sent to look for a vehicle with the license plate 2CFX260 that was 
reported leaving the scene of the burglary. (Trial Tr., p. 400, Ls. 1-3; p. 400, L. 
24 - p. 401, L. 9; p. 401, L. 19 - p. 402, L. 19.) Using the plate number, Officer 
Schreiber found the vehicle was registered to Maribel McMinn, residing at 516 
Ash. (Trial Tr., p. 403, Ls. 3-14.) At trial, Devan confirmed that his mother's 
name is Maribel Nelson, maiden name McMinn, and that he resides with her at 
516 Ash. (Trial Tr., p. 509, L. 14 - p. 510, L. 1.) 
After spotting the vehicle in a motel parking lot, Officer Schreiber parked 
40 or 50 yards away and conducted surveillance. (Trial Tr., p. 403, L. 21 - p. 
405, L. 2; p. 408, Ls. 2-13.) Within 15 minutes, a man later identified as Devan 
approached Officer Schreiber, concerned he was being followed. (Trial Tr., p. 
409, L. 13 - p. 410, L. 21.) Upon Officer Schreiber's request, Devan produced 
his driver's license which showed his address as 516 Ash, the same as that 
associated with the suspect vehicle. (Trial Tr., p. 411, Ls. 3-24.) 
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Devan points out that the victim, Karl Riebe, could not identify Devan as 
one of the burglars. (Appellant's brief, p. 15; Trial Tr., p. 217, L. 16-219, p. 10 
(victim confronted two women in one car, at close range); Trial Tr., p. 229, Ls. 1-
19 (911 dispatch, which Riebe called, told him to stay concealed).) However, 
Riebe testified that there were several people and two distinct cars involved, 
including the vehicle with license plate 2CFX260. (Trial Tr., p. 228, L. 4 - p. 231, 
L. 24.) Also, Devan's self-serving testimony that he was not involved in the 
conspiracy is plainly insufficient to overcome the vast weight of evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict against him. (Trial Tr., p. 512, Ls. 18-25.) 
Given the weight of evidence against Devan, he cannot show a 
reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was swayed by the prosecutor's 
comments in closing argument. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Rather, the record amply supports that the jury's verdict was reached without 
regard to those comments. Even if Devan could show the prosecutor's 
comments amounted to error, he has not shown the error affected the outcome 
of his case. kl Accordingly, Devan has failed to demonstrate fundamental error 
from prosecutorial misconduct. 19..:. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 7th day of May, 2013. 
o:f:/JfX::;;;/F-;5:/ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of May, 2013, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
DA~~ 
Deputy Attorney Gene: 
DJH/pm 
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